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OFFICER DECISION MAKING

Thursday, 20th December, 2012
at 2.00 pm

PLEASE NOTE TIME OF MEETING

OFFICE OF SENIOR MANAGER- CITY SERVICES

This meeting is not open to the public

Decision Maker

Community Safety Manager

Contacts

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AGENDA

Agendas and papers are available via the Council's website

1 **REVIEW OF AMENDMENTS AND APPROVAL OF REVISED SOTONSAFE PLAN
VERSION 6**

Report of Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Manager seeking approval for amendments to the Plan, attached.

Wednesday, 12 December 2012 HEAD OF LEGAL, HR AND DEMOCRATIC SERVICES

Agenda Item 1

DECISION-MAKER:	COMMUNITY SAFETY MANAGER
SUBJECT:	REVIEW OF AMENDMENTS AND APPROVAL OF REVISED SOTONSAFE PLAN VERSION 6
DATE OF DECISION:	20 DECEMBER 2012
REPORT OF:	EMERGENCY PLANNING AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGER
STATEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY	
None.	

BRIEF SUMMARY

In order to comply with the Radiation Emergency Preparedness & Public Information Regulations 2001, (REPPPIR) Southampton City Council (SCC) as 'Off-Site' statutory authority is required to produce and approve an off-site emergency plan ('the Plan') to deal with any accident that may reasonably foreseeably occur when a nuclear powered submarine is berthed within the port of Southampton.

There is a duty to review, revise and where necessary reissue the plan within a three year cycle. This is in addition to the duty to update the Plan on an ongoing basis to reflect changes in practical detail and arrangements throughout the life of the Plan. This process has been initiated and informed primarily by revised safety planning requirements, exercising of the plan and organizational/structural changes within the response statutory agencies comprising the SotonSafe Emergency Planning Group (SEPG) since approval of Version 5 of the Plan on the 17th December 2009.

Amendments are shown at Appendix 1 of this report. Draft Version 6 of the SotonSafe Plan will be made available to the decision maker prior to the decision meeting.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (i) To approve logistical, organizational and grammatical amendments to the Plan, as set out within Appendix 1 of this report.
- (ii) To authorise the Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Manager to make such typographical and textual amendments to the draft Plan as may be required to give effect to this decision prior to publication.
- (iii) To approve Version 6 of the Plan for publication.

REASONS FOR REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Having fully considered this matter in consultation with statutory partners and public interface the Emergency Planning Manager (EPM) considers that no major changes have occurred since the last revision of the Plan and that the amendments, which are primarily organisational and technical in nature, meet the requirement of all related legislation.
2. It is anticipated that the revised Plan will, subject to approval, be published either in late December or early in January 2013. No submarine visits to the Port will take place during the intervening period.

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS CONSIDERED AND REJECTED

3. (i) Do nothing, retain current arrangements.
This would potentially breach our legal and moral obligation to review and revise in a timely manner and to reflect organisational and technical changes that have occurred since the last review of the Plan.
- (ii) Approve further, more major infrastructural changes to the Plan.
Testing and review of the plan, including review by the relevant statutory regulator, has demonstrated that the plan is considered fit for purpose without further major changes being required. In addition, no major or significant changes have occurred to the Port, City or Operators Plan requirements within the review period that would render changes to the Plan necessary in order to accommodate a change in circumstances relevant to the off-site safety plan.

DETAIL (Including consultation carried out)

CONSULTATION

4. Consultation upon this proposal was issued to statutory agencies on the 15th September 2012. This included Police, Fire & Rescue Service, Ambulance Service Trust, Associated British Ports, Health Agencies, New Forest District Council, Health & Safety Executive Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and the Environment Agency. Their responses, where appropriate, have further informed the amendment process.
5. Further information has been made available on the Emergency Planning area of the Southampton City Council Website, and the proposed decision included within the Council's Forward Plan of decisions published on the 3rd October 2012, including details of how to comment on the proposal. In addition public notices were placed within Peartree and Sholing Local Housing Office, Woolston Library, Ocean Village Marina, National Oceanography Centre, Hythe Mariner and Hythe and Dibden Community Centre.
6. An ongoing dialogue, albeit less frequent, continues with the Solent Coalition Against Nuclear Ships (SCANS) who were notified of this proposed decision by email letter on 12th October to their Chairman and have been invited to comment as appropriate. The letter was also copied to SCC Cabinet Members, and Ward Members for Bargate, Woolston and Hythe, being the wards most likely to be directly affected by the emergency planning precautions contained in the Plan.
7. The closing date for consultation was the 9th November 2012. No comments relative to this decision have been forthcoming.

DETAILS

8. SCC has assumed responsibility for the SotonSafe 'Off-Site' Plan since 2002, with the introduction of REPIIR legislation. Any decision in relation to the need to maintain a nuclear powered submarine berthing facility within the port rests with the MOD. The designated operational Berth 38 is located adjacent to the former QE2 passenger terminal at Dock Head within the

Eastern Docks.

9. Legislation requires 'that the local authority prepare a written off-site emergency plan, which comprises a number of component elements, for any premises (includes a vessel) within the operators emergency plan', SotNusafe.
10. The HSE ONR scrutinise the extent of the emergency planning and public information zone and determine the area which this should cover for the purposes of the Regulations. In the case of the Southampton port berth that is 1.5km radius. The off-site emergency plan is required to take account of measures taken by the operator to prevent radiation emergencies and measures taken to limit their consequences if they should occur. The degree of planning is required to be proportionate to the probability of an accident occurring and local geography amongst other relevant matters.
11. Responsibility for this work rests with the City Council Emergency Planning and Business Continuity Manager (EPM) who reports through normal internal channels and to the interagency SEPG chaired by the City Council Community Safety Manager. Ongoing assessment, planning, exercising, evaluation and informing of the public within the planning zones is subject to a 3 year REPPIR review cycle monitored by the MOD Regulator and ONR Superintending Inspector.
12. In September 2006, upon approval of Version 4 of the plan, SCC Cabinet granted delegated power for review and future amendment of the plan to the Community Safety Manager. That authority remains in place.
13. Chief Staff Officer Engineering at Navy Command is responsible for the compilation of the vessel operators SotNusafe Plan. The Plans complement each other and with other documents form a suite of information to ensure an effective response in the highly unlikely event of a reactor emergency arising whilst such a vessel in berthed in port.
14. It should be noted that all amendments do not in themselves impact directly upon the community. More detailed information relating to the amendments is included at Appendix 1.
15. The Southampton Plans were exercised on an interagency, multi site basis on the 19th January 2012, the outcomes of which have been utilised to further inform related plan development and organisational response. The exercise was observed by ONR officers and credited as a satisfactory demonstration of the Plans. Associated outcomes are shown at Appendix 2.
16. Between 1977 and 2012, 18 such visits to the Port have taken place, normally of 5 days duration, during the course of which no incidents have arisen concerning the vessels nuclear plant. Each visit is now preceded by an interagency pre-visit check of meeting and associated briefing.
17. The tragic events aboard submarine HMS Astute whilst berthed in Southampton on Friday 8th April 2011 was subject to review by the SEPG. All duties under REPPIR have been confirmed as complete by the RN Regulator and ONR Superintending Inspector. The report is attached at Appendix 3.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

Capital/Revenue

18. None.

Property/Other

19. Any costs relative to this proposal will be recovered from the Navy.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Statutory power to undertake proposals in the report:

20. The Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001 ('REPPIR') and associated guidance on the Regulations.

Other Legal Implications:

21. In reviewing the Plan the Council is required to act reasonably, have regard to all relevant equalities legislation, the provisions of section 17 of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 and the impact of the Proposals on communities and individuals in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998. The Council is satisfied that the adoption of the Plan and the provisions within it are necessary and proportionate to address a pressing social need (the maintenance of public safety) and therefore interference with any of the qualified rights provided under the Act are justified in order to ensure the protection of the wider Southampton community and to preserve public safety in the unlikely event of a nuclear incident involving a submarine berthed in the port of Southampton.

POLICY FRAMEWORK IMPLICATIONS

22. (i) SCC Community Strategy - None, public safety is not compromised by this proposal which is based upon detailed risk assessment, professionally informed and evaluated

23. (ii) SCC Community Safety Strategy - None, as at (i) above

23. (iii) SCC Health & Wellbeing Strategy – None, as (i) above

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KEY DECISION? Yes

WARDS/COMMUNITIES AFFECTED:	Part of Bargate, Woolston & Weston, Hythe Village Centre
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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

Appendices

1.	Schedule of amendments – SotonSafe Version 5.1
2.	Exercise ‘Foxwater 12’ – Outcomes
3.	Submarine HMS Astute Incident Report

Documents In Members’ Rooms

1.	N/A
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Equality Impact Assessment

Do the implications/subject of the report require an Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) to be carried out.	No
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Other Background Documents

SotonSafe (Z Berth) Off-Site Reactor Emergency Plan – Draft Version 6

<http://www.southampton.gov.uk/s-environment/emergency-planning/emergencyplans/sotonplan.aspx>

Equality Impact Assessment and Other Background documents available for inspection at: SCC Emergency Planning & Business Continuity Unit, City Depot Southampton

Title of Background Paper(s)	Relevant Paragraph of the Access to Information Procedure Rules / Schedule 12A allowing document to be Exempt/Confidential (if applicable)
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1.	None	
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SotonSafe Plan resume of amendments from version 5.1

Part	Section	Page	Amendment	Reference
	Front Cover		Update with new Version number and dated December 2012	Amendment
	Contents	v	Insert 5.1 Pre Visit Arrangements Amend 5.2 Alerting Procedures	Atkins Assessment
	Contents	v	Amend 6.10 Health & Safety Executive – Office for Nuclear Regulation throughout document.	Amendment
1	1.3	1-2	There are no hazardous installations which are required to comply with the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 within the Pre-Planned Countermeasures Zone (PCMZ). Those sites outside of the 1.5km zone but located nearby such as BP Hamble and Fawley Refinery are made aware of visits by a nuclear powered vessel.	Atkins Assessment
1	1.4	1-3	In the very unlikely event of a reactor emergency in the Port of Southampton, the general public will be advised of actions to take by the Local Authority. A Tactical Co-ordination Centre will be set up, normally at the City Depot of Southampton City Council adjacent to Dock Gate 20. Reserve locations for the TCC have been identified and if required will be decided at the time by police in consultation with Southampton City Council. The Tactical Co-ordination Centre will provide the local point for Command and Control and will use the media and a help line to issue information and advice	Atkins Assessment
1	1.4	1-4	Reference to additional plans added HIOW LRF Media Plan HIOW LRF Recovery Plan HIOW LRF Humanitarian Assistance Guidance HIOW LRF Mass Fatalities Plan ABP Landside Emergency Plan New Forest District Council Emergency Plan	Atkins Assessment
1	1.4	1-5	In the event of a reactor emergency support would be provided by neighbouring Local Authorities by mutual aid as agreed in the HIOW LRF MOU between Chief Executives. Neighbouring Local Authorities are also members of the SotonSafe Emergency Planning Group.	Atkins Assessment
1	1.5	1-5	Public Consultation Meetings Historically public consultation meetings have taken place annually and to the future meetings will be held on a needs basis.	Atkins Assessment

1	1.5	1-9	<p><u>Nuclear Vessel Movement Principles</u></p> <p>d). An authorised Admiralty Pilot and an authorised Southampton Pilot will be embarked for arrival and for departure to provide navigational and towage advice to the nuclear powered vessel's command team.</p>	Amendment
1	1.6	1-12	COUNTERMEASURE for Evacuation ERL 30 mSv (Whole body dose)	Atkins Assessment
2	2.1	2-2	(i). the pre-planning arrangements for the impending visit of a nuclear powered vessel which includes an interagency check off meeting.	Atkins Assessment
2	2.2	2-2	Within these waters all maritime vessel movements are subject to the direction of the Southampton Harbour Master who derives his authority directly from the Southampton Harbour Acts and by agreement with the Queen's Harbour Master Portsmouth.	Amendment
2	2.3	2-3	<p>The operator has undertaken an assessment of the risk associated with potential accidents through the identification of a Reference Accident. A Reference Accident is defined as the worst-case accident which, although unlikely, is realistically possible.</p> <p>In accordance with REPPiR the Reference Accident forms the basis of emergency response plans for the protection of the work force and the public who may be affected.</p> <p>The HSE/ONR have determined that an off-site emergency plan is required for the protection of the public within an area extending to a distance of not less than 1.5km from a submarine berth.</p>	Amendment
2	2.3	2-4	<p><u>Reference Accident characteristics</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A number of cautious assumptions are made about the radioactive material inventory and other characteristics of the reactor. • A leak occurs in the primary cooling circuit of the reactor, which cannot be isolated and is beyond the capacity of coolant make-up systems. • A series of unlikely engineering and other failures also occur. • The primary coolant leak coupled with the other failures lead to damage to the fuel within the reactor after more than 3 hours, resulting in elevated gamma radiation levels around the reactor. • The fuel damage in turn releases some radioactive material from the reactor. This is largely contained within the submarine but a 	Atkins Assessment

			<p>small proportion may be released to the environment over the following 1-2 days.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The radioactive material would be carried downwind and would therefore present a hazard in the downwind zone only. This hazard would arise principally via inhalation initially. 	
3	3.1	3-2	<p>The organisation is commanded by a Senior Police Officer and based at the Tactical Co-ordination Centre (TCC) normally at City Depot, adjacent to Dock Gate 20, Southampton (See figure 8 page 3-10). Reserve locations for the TCC have been identified and if required will be decided at the time by police in consultation with Southampton City Council. New Forest District Council will also open their Tactical Co-ordination Centre at Appletree Court.</p>	Atkins Assessment
3	3.1	3-3	<p>Chaired by the Chief Constable and based at the Strategic Co-ordination Centre which is formed at the Police Training School, Netley. (See figure 9 page 3-11). Reserve locations for the SCC have been identified and if required will be decided at the time by police. The Chair of the group will change to the Local Authority Chief Executive post-emergency to co-ordinate remediation issues. The location may also change site at that time e.g. to Civic Offices, Southampton.</p>	Atkins Assessment
3	3.3	3-13	<p>Change to Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (Alverstoke). (NEMT) throughout document.</p>	Amendment
3	3.3	3-14	<p>The monitoring information is loaded onto NERIMS at EMHQ and the distances out to where sheltering and issue of PITS are required in the downwind sector are automatically calculated based on the SSILs used for Southampton. This will enable an assessment to be made on the adequacy of the automatic countermeasures that were previously implemented and to provide any additional advice as required.</p> <p>Ground monitoring is undertaken at the same time as air sampling, whilst a release is postulated or continuing, and after any release stops. Ground Monitoring results are also entered onto NERIMS at the EMHQ and will be used to facilitate decision making on a number of issues including the implementation of food bans and any remediation measures likely to be necessary during the recovery phase of the emergency.</p>	Amendment

3	3.3	3-14	<p><u>Health Physicists to the Incident Officer (ABP).</u></p> <p>The main priorities are to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> On arrival confirm status of the reactor emergency (OSNE, OSNE radiation hazard confirmed, OSNE release of radioactive material confirmed) and ascertain wind direction. Check status of countermeasures for the Exclusion Zone (EZ), Automatic Countermeasure Zone (ACMZ), the remaining Port area including any ships, clearly identifying as far as possible how many personnel may still be in the exclusion zone and ACMZ Gain latest monitoring information and latest technical information available on the status of the nuclear powered vessel (NPV) Check if any intervention activities are planned and advise on whether they are justified 	Amendment
3	3.3	3-15	<p><u>Health Physicist at the ICP</u></p> <p>In addition to the priorities for the Health Physicist to the Incident Officer, the main priorities are to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Ascertain if any mitigation or lifesaving actions being considered Confirm the correct employees and intervention teams are available and where possible dressed, standing by and checking their equipment e.g. EPDs, communications? With OIC ICP, begin completing Permit to Enter forms and discuss possible interventions with the team and establish if they have any concerns. <p>Follow the intervention procedure detailed in SOTNUSAFE</p>	Amendment
3	3.3	3-15	<p><u>Dstl Health Physicist to Tactical Level (Silver)</u></p> <p>The role of the Dstl Health Physicist is to provide specialist radiation protection advice and health physics support to the MOD contingent at Silver and to provide support to the whole Silver Command team. Note Dstl are appointed as the Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA) to MOD and other organisations involved in the response may have their own RPA appointed.</p> <p>The main priorities of the Health Physicist Tactical are:</p>	Amendment

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. On arrival, obtain latest information regarding status of reactor incident/accident and category (e.g. RSA, ONSE etc), status of countermeasures for Shelter/PITs, latest technical information from Technical Advisory Support Group (TASG), TRAMS readings and contamination monitoring results from NEMT/NERIMS and the Wind direction. b. Establish contact with Dstl Health Physicists at Bronze and Gold to identify key priorities. c. Liaise with the MOD Senior Representative (MCA Liaison Officer) regarding: the likelihood of an off-site radiological hazard occurring, current monitoring results and adequacy of current countermeasures, monitoring status and the capability to deliver the Gold/STAC monitoring strategy, status of any intervention tasks. d. Provide RPA advice to MOD essential workers including teams supporting issue of PITs. 	
3	3.3	3-19	<p><u>Duties of the Health Physicist to the MCA at Strategic (Gold) level include:</u></p> <p>The primary role of the Dstl Health Physicist at Gold is to provide specialist radiation protection advice and health physicist specialist support to the MCA and his team and to MOD responders. The secondary role is to provide information and support to the all agency response team. Note the all agency response team will have statutory and executive responsibilities and Dstl should be deferring to these agencies after MOD issues have been raised.</p> <p>The main priorities of the Health Physicist Tactical are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. On arrival, make contact with the MCA and his team and identify the MCA's key strategic priorities for MOD as the Lead Government Department, obtain latest information regarding status of reactor incident/accident and category (e.g. RSA, ONSE etc), status of countermeasures for Shelter/PITs, latest technical information from Technical Advisory Support Group (TASG), TRAMS readings and contamination monitoring results from NEMT/NERIMS and the Wind direction. b. Establish contact with Dstl Health Physicists at Bronze and Silver. c. Provide support to 42 Geo with the generation of maps or monitoring plots d. Agree with the MCA the frequency for any meeting and discussions. Normally one HP supports the MCA and his team directly and the second HP supports the STAC and RWG. 	Amendment

			<p>e. Attend STAC meetings and report back any key issues to the MCA.</p> <p>f. If there are sufficient resources attend the RWG meetings but the priority is to support the STAC.</p> <p>g. Brief the MCA or his Staff Officer just prior to attendance at STAC on any strategic issues including: Current monitoring results, adequacy of Current countermeasures, monitoring status and the capability to deliver the Gold/STAC monitoring strategy, RPA advice for MOD personnel.</p> <p>h. Liaise with MOD HQ NARO to inform of any key issues for consideration.</p> <p>i. Ensure Operations Log on NERIMS is kept up to date with details of significant events relevant to the accident.</p>	
3	3.3	3-23	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advise Defra on any need for an Exemption Order under the Environmental Permitting (England & Wales) Regulations 2010 (as amended) to facilitate the efficient management and disposal of radioactive wastes. 	Amendment
4	4.2	4-2	<p>From a communications and information context, the priority should be to invoke the HIOW LRF Major Incident Media Plan which utilises all means of communication including social media to provide information to the public and establish a Communication and Information Cell (CIC) at the Tactical Co-ordination Centre immediately.</p>	Atkins Assessment
4	4.2	4-3	<p><u>Provision of Information to the Public</u> There is a requirement under REPPIR 2001 for Local Authorities to provide information to the public in the event of a radiation emergency. This information is shown at paragraph 4.3. and could be used to inform the public beyond the Pre-planned countermeasures zone if necessary. Existing media statements could be issued to the media for the public in the extendibility zone.</p>	Atkins Assessment
4	4.2	4.3	<p><u>Termination of the off-site emergency arrangements</u> The Strategic Co-ordinating Group will consider the timing and method of terminating the off-site emergency arrangements, including the content of final statements to the media.</p>	Atkins Assessment

5	5.1	5-1	Pre Visit Check Off Meeting Before the arrival of the NPV at the Port of Southampton an interagency check off meeting is held to ensure all agencies are aware and prepared for the visit and to consider pre visit training & briefing of staff, availability of key response staff by agency, and to ensure key facilities & support equipment is available etc.	Atkins Assessment
5	5.4	5-7	7. The Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (Alverstoke) (NEMT (A)) will commence surveys in the immediate area of the potential hazard in accordance with established monitoring protocols.	Amendment
6	6.1	6-1	Emergency exposures are not exposures to personnel as a direct result of the radiation emergency. These exposures are covered by Regulation 23 of the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999.	Amendment
6	6.3	6-6	Contaminated vehicles within the Automatic Countermeasures Zone (ACMZ) will remain within the 500m cordon and advice and guidance will be sought with regard to decontamination. The Government Decontamination Service (GDS) can be contacted 24/7 and will be able to provide necessary advice and guidance if required.	Atkins Assessment
6	6.4	6-7	If the PED alarms then HFRS staff must take two PIT's, put on the particulate respirator (if not already in BA) and evacuate to the holding area. The fact that the their PED has alarmed must be reported to the HFRS Liaison Officer in the ICC, who should in turn notify the IO (ABP) and the HFRS Tactical Commander at Silver.	Amendment
6	6.5	6-11	Emergency Exposure The maximum dose for life saving operations where the casualty cannot be immediately removed from the area of high dose rate or contamination is 100 mSv; all ambulance staff can volunteer to be exposed to this level provided that they have been fully briefed and understand the implications. NHS Emergency Planning Guidance – The Ambulance Service Guidance on dealing with radiological incidents and emergencies issued 23/03/2010.	Atkins Assessment
6	6.4	6-8	It may be permissible for informed volunteer male fire-fighters from Hampshire Fire & Rescue Service to be exposed to a dose of up to 100 mSv for life saving operations or to maintain critical infrastructure . The authorisation for the disapplication of dose limits (i.e. allowing	Atkins Assessment

			emergency exposure to take place) must be given by an officer or manager within the Fire and Rescue Service who has received appropriate training. Female fire-fighters will not be subjected to any radiation exposures. <i>Fire and Rescue Service Operational Guidance – Generic Risk Assessments 5.5 – Incidents involving Radiation dated January 2011.</i>	
6	6.7	6-13	<p>Insert new section</p> <p><u>Radiation Monitoring Unit</u></p> <p>In the event of a radiation emergency, there may be a requirement to establish a Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU) to undertake radiation monitoring of the public.</p> <p>The H&IOW Plan for the Establishment and Operation of a Radiation Monitoring Unit is an Operational Plan for long term monitoring of the population affected by an incident. An RMU is used to determine levels of radioactive contamination in or on people and any subsequent requirement for decontamination. It will also inform decisions regarding the need for any medical interventions for persons contaminated with radioactive material.</p> <p>The plan forms part of the emergency planning arrangements of the Thames Valley and Hampshire & Isle of Wight Local Resilience Forums and will be used in conjunction with those arrangements.</p> <p>The coordination of the monitoring of people in general (apart from at site specific locations) is the responsibility of the NHS.</p> <p>Coordination of resources is carried out in accordance with a monitoring strategy agreed at the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) passed via the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). This coordination and monitoring strategy depends upon on the source of the radiation, the type of event and the number of people affected.</p>	Amendment
6	6.10	6-16	<p><u>Health & Safety Executive – Office for Nuclear Regulation</u></p> <p>All references to NII changed to ONR</p>	Amendment

7	7.10	7-8	<p>There are seven walk routes identified within the 1.5km Pre-Planned Countermeasures Zone as follows:</p> <p>Walk routes 1- 3 - Central Southampton Walk routes 4 - 6 – Woolston & Weston Walk route 7 - Hythe</p> <p><i>NB. An up to date list of roads within these areas to which PITs are distributed is contained in the PITs distribution plan and is not reproduced here in the main plan as the routes are amended on a regular basis taking into account building development in these areas.</i></p>	Foxwater 12
8	8.3	8-2	m). Associated British Ports (ABP)	Amendment
App2	1.5	A2-3	In the unlikely event of a submarine reactor emergency occurring, the MoD Head Quarters Nuclear Emergency Response Organisation (MOD HQ NERO) would fulfil this requirement for cross government co-operation by convening the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).	Amendment
App 4	App 4	A4-1 to A4-10	<p><u>Public Information Leaflet</u></p> <p>A copy of the public information leaflet provided to all households within the Pre-Planned Countermeasures Zone (PCMZ). This is the area within 1.5km (0.9 miles) radius of the berth.</p> <p>Insert latest version of the public information leaflet July 2012 to July 2015.</p>	Amendment
App 6	App 6.1	A6-2	A recovery strategy may well be more effective if it is developed in consultation with the affected population. This will be achieved by using existing mechanisms to consult with recognised Community Associations or Community Groups in the affected area.	Atkins Assessment

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Post-exercise Foxwater 12 – Regulatory observations and actions

DRAFT AND WORK IN PROGRESS. None of the issues shown are deemed Plan critical in so far as none of them render the Plan or the ability of off-site partner agencies to respond effectively in accordance with the Plan, but rather are ongoing improvements identified as part of a continuous learning.

Agency	No	Learning points	Further Development	By Whom	Comments/ Completion date	Status
Office for Nuclear Regulation	1	Consideration should be given to the adequacy of emergency signage along the full evacuation route to the Evacuation Zone Reception Centre (EZRC).	Additional temporary signs will be provided.	MOD	Additional temporary signs will be provided by MOD	Complete
	2	Lack of visibility of a central focus point to provide overall command & control situation overview.	Consider how best to maintain a running / incident log available for all staff / agencies within the TCC by making use of state boards / IT solutions.	SCC	1. Greater use of GIS mapping for real time maps will be provided in the TCC. 2. Greater use of state boards and TV screens to provide commentary of events etc. Training provided and new role of Information Officer introduced. 3. Repositioning of TV to be visible in Multi Agency area of TCC.	Complete Complete Complete

	3	Consider how the TCG should operate in terms of information flow, scheduling of TCG meetings and briefings etc.	Consider pre-scripted sample checklists and work instructions and standing agendas.	SCC	Action cards already form part of SotonSafe plan. Amendment as required during Version 6 update of SotonSafe.	Complete
				Police	Standing agendas as per the Strategic Coordinating Centre Manual of Guidance will be used at TCC. Time table of TCG meetings etc will be set by police.	Complete
	4	Improve the TCG action management process to ensure actions are followed up and completed.	System to record and disseminate actions. Provide systems and staff to support command & control process.	Police	In the event of an incident police will provide necessary personnel and systems to ensure TCG process is managed by use of agendas, minutes of meetings, allocation of actions and decisions being recorded.	Complete
	5	The length of TCG meetings, coupled with extended telephone discussions with strategic command meant that the police commander had limited opportunity to manage and coordinate the response.	<p>1. Also identified by police as an issue.</p> <p>2. Identification of suitably trained and accredited commanders.</p> <p>3. Appropriate staffing levels alleviate this problem.</p>	Police	<p>1. It is not necessary for Silver Commander to monitor or take part in Gold level meetings.</p> <p>2. Cadre of commanders are likely to be used for incidents/exercises of this nature in the future.</p> <p>3. Appropriate staffing levels to be provided by the police.</p>	<p>Complete</p> <p>Complete</p> <p>Complete</p>

	6	The TCG initially spent a great deal of time discussing countermeasures.	<p>1. Improve awareness of what is in the plan by providing a briefing on PIT's distribution prior to an exercise or visit to ensure all have a greater understanding.</p> <p>2. Provide training to Southampton City Council staff in the SotonSafe Plan & PIT's Distribution Plan.</p>	SCC	<p>1. Cross referencing of the PIT's Distribution Plan made in SotonSafe Plan Version 6 to be published December 2012.</p> <p>Briefing on PIT's Distribution Plan to be part of pre visit arrangements / exercise briefing.</p> <p>2. Briefing in the PIT's Distribution Plan to be provided during SCC Emergency Response Team Training Day November 2012.</p>	<p>Completed</p> <p>Complete</p> <p>Complete</p>
DISTAFF/ SONART	7	Response provided under separate cover.	Been considered under confidential cover. SEPG membership aware.	PM NUC	All actions have been completed.	Complete
MOD/DSTL/ NAVAL REGULATOR	8	Response provided under separate cover.	Been considered under confidential cover. SEPG membership aware	PM NUC	All actions have been completed.	Complete

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Southampton City Council

**PORTFOLIO /
CABINET**

Southampton City Council - Corporate

MEMBER:**DATE:**

July 2011

SUBJECT:

Incident Review – SotonSafe Plan

AUTHOR(S):Graham Wyeth - Emergency Planning and Business
Continuity Manager**DIRECTORATE:**

Environment

POLICY CO-

By delegated authority - Linda Haitana through Sarita

ORDINATOR:

Riley(Legal)

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This matter is presented for information / update purposes only.

1. BACKGROUND:

Southampton City Council (SCC) assumes a statutory duty under the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001 (REPPPIR) for the SotonSafe Port of Southampton Off-site Reactor Emergency Plan. The Plan ensures an integrated and collaborative multi agency response in the highly unlikely event of a nuclear emergency arising during a visit to the Port of Southampton by a nuclear powered submarine that may impact upon naval personnel, Port operatives or general public safety. This duty is discharged by the interagency SotonSafe Emergency Planning Group (SEPG) and due process of the City Council.

The Royal Navy (RN) notified its intension for the nuclear powered submarine HMS Astute to visit the port between Wednesday 6th and Sunday 10th April 2011 in advance, allowing the appropriate prerequisites of such a visit to be fully assessed and implemented. Such assessment is based upon events that are reasonably foreseeable.

The vessel was dully received onto her designated Berth 38 Eastern Docks as scheduled.

As a result of a well publicised incident on board HMS Astute whilst berthed in the Port on Friday 8th April 2011, a duty falls to SCC under REPPPIR to review the SotonSafe Plan for any changes that may be required as a result of the incident and its potential implications for a radiation emergency. It is important to emphasise that in doing so this process does not touch upon or potentially compromise the Police led criminal investigation, RN internal investigation or subsequent Coroners Inquest surrounding the incident.

At its meeting on 10th May the SEPG noted the requirement and a subgroup was established to examine and report upon any such implications. The group comprised the following officers, all of whom had been actively engaged within pre, during and post visit requirements of HMS Astute:

Graham Wyeth - SCC Emergency Planning Manager
Captain Ray Blair – Deputy Harbour Master
Police Superintendent Steven France-Sargeant
Iain Bowker – Royal Navy PM Nuclear

The group met on Friday 24th July 2011 to consider the matter and report accordingly.

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2. SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES:

It is recognised that at no stage during the incident of the 8th April was the nuclear plant of HMS Astute at risk or the need to activate the SotonSafe Plan required.

While a firearms discharge on the submarine was not a reasonably foreseeable event beforehand the need now arises to review the technical and safety appraisals that inform both the operators and off-site plans with a view to whether or not such an incident, if it were to occur in any critical areas of the vessel could result in a release of radiation and risk to personnel and public safety. The operator by virtue of its related SotNusafe Plan will discharge its duty under separate cover

In relation to its off-site responsibility the group considered errant behaviour of intruders, visitors and crew and is fully satisfied the RN procedures and control measures in place are more than sufficient to ensure the integrity and safety of the vessel and on board nuclear plant. Indeed, given that status of the vessel as a warship and its protective measures it would take an infringement of monumental proportions or a significant chain of uninterrupted events to create the risk to which SotonSafe applies.

It is considered inappropriate and unnecessary to further consider in the context of this report the nature and details of those measures.

3. CONCLUSION:

The sub group considers that no issues arise as a result of the incident on board HMS Astute on the date in question that require change or amendment to the SotonSafe Plan.

In doing so the agreement of the Solicitor and lead officer of the City Council and the Superintendent of the Office for Nuclear Regulation is sought that Southampton City Council through its SEPG has discharged its duty under Regulation 4 (1C) and 10 (1) of REPPiR or advise of any further assessment or action that should be undertaken.